Strategic Similarity and Emergent Conventions: Evidence from Similar Stag Hunt Games |
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Authors: | Frederick W. Rankin John B. Van Huyck Raymond C. Battalio |
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Affiliation: | a Olin School of Business, Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri, 63130-4899;b Department of Economics, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas, 77843-4228;c Department of Economics, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas, 77843-4228 |
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Abstract: | This paper reports evidence on the origin of convention in laboratory cohorts confronting similar but not identical strategic situations repeatedly. The experiment preserves the action space of the game, while randomly perturbing the payoffs and scrambling the action labels in an effort to blunt the salience of retrospective selection principles. Hence, the similarity between stage games is reduced to certain strategic details, like efficiency, security, and risk dominance. Nevertheless, we do observe conventions emerging in half of the laboratory cohorts. When a convention emerges subjects's behavior conforms to the selection principles of efficiency rather than security or risk dominance. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C78, C92, D83. |
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Keywords: | evolutionary games coordination similarity convention payoff dominance risk dominance learning human behavior |
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