The Partnered Core of a Game without Side Payments |
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Authors: | Philip J Reny Myrna Holtz Wooders |
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Institution: | aDepartment of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 15260;bDepartment of Economics, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, M5S 1A1 |
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Abstract: | A payoff for a game is partnered if it admits no asymmetric dependencies. We introduce the partnered core of a game without side payments and show that the partnered core of a balanced game is nonempty. The result is a strengthening of Scarf's Theorem on the nonemptiness of the core of a balanced game without side payments. In addition, it is shown that if there are at most a countable number of points in the partnered core of a game then at least one core point isminimallypartnered, meaning that no player requires any other player in particular to obtain his part of the core payoff.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C71. |
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