Does monitoring by the media improve the performance of government banks? |
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| Institution: | 1. Department of Money and Banking, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan, ROC;2. Actuarial Department, Taiwan Life Insurance Co. Ltd, Taiwan, ROC;1. Department of Economics, Monash University, PO Box 197, Caulfield East, VIC 3145, Australia;2. College of Business, University of Texas at San Antonio, One University Circle, San Antonio, TX 78249, USA;3. Business School, University of Adelaide, 10 Pulteney Street, Adelaide, South Australia 5005, Australia;1. Department of Finance, Feng Chia University, 100 Wenhwa Road, Seatwen, Taichung 40724, Taiwan;2. Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, University of Dalat, 01 Phu Dong Thien Vuong Street, Dalat City, Lamdong, Vietnam;3. Department of Finance, National Chung Hsing University, 250 Kuo Kuang Road, Taichung 402, Taiwan |
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| Abstract: | By examining cross-country data for the period from 2000 to 2010, this study investigates whether monitoring by the media affects the performance of government-owned banks (GOBs). The results indicate that GOBs under strong monitoring do not underperform privately owned banks (POBs), whereas those under weak monitoring do underperform POBs. Further, we find that the strength of the media's monitoring has an important effect on corruption behavior and banks’ performance. This result provides an important policy implication that the government should minimize its ownership, and therefore its influence, in the media sector if it intends to improve the performance of its GOBs. |
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| Keywords: | Government banks Media monitoring Operation performance Lending corruption |
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