“棘轮式”代理问题与子公司经理人激励:家族集团治理

家族集团中,在企业家通过本期产出水平来确定子公司经理人所应上缴的产出分配收益的情况下,经理人会通过调整自己的努力水平,间接控制自己在下期的上缴额度,从而导致激励效率损失.但是,如果企业家能收取固定的产出分配收益,并确定高额违约金,就能够有效地规避子公司经理人代理问题.

Ratchet-agency Problem and Managerial Incentives:the Family-controlled Group Governance

In a family-controlled group,when the decision of the subsidiary-company manager's turn-in level is made by the entrepreneur through the output level,the manager should adjust his endeavor level to control the turn-in level in the next period and then cause the loss of the incentive efficiency.Simultaneously,this paper proves that if the fixed agency's turn-in level and the high level default fine are included in the contract,the contract can avoid the ratchet-agency problem and confirm a long-term work.