银行针对中小企业“惜贷”行为的博弈分析 |
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引用本文: | 葛宁洁.银行针对中小企业“惜贷”行为的博弈分析[J].铜陵财经专科学校学报,2011(2):41-42. |
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作者姓名: | 葛宁洁 |
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作者单位: | 安徽大学,安徽合肥230000 |
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摘 要: | 文章从银行管理者角度,以银行实现自身收益最大化为目标,通过建立一个动态的博弈模型,辨析银行对劳动密集型的中小企业采取惜贷或放贷行为的合理性。在此基础上,对提高银行自身的盈利能力,解决劳动密集型的中小企业融资难问题提供政策建议。
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关 键 词: | 银行惜贷 劳动密集型的中小企业 融资 博弈分析 |
Game Theory Analysis of‘Credit Grudging' Behavior of Banks |
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Authors: | Ge Ning-jie |
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Institution: | Ge Ning-jie (Anhui University,Hefei Anhui 230000,China) |
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Abstract: | From the perspective of bank regulators and aiming at the objective of maximizing bank's revenue,through the establishment of a dynamic game model,the article analyzes the rationality of bank loans to the labor—intensive SMEs.On this basis,the article provides policy recommendations and assistant to improve the profitability of banks and to solve the financing difficulties of labor-intensive SMEs. |
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Keywords: | bank credit grudging labor-intensive SMEs financing game analysis |
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