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制度变迁中的权力博弈分析
引用本文:罗能生,谢里,洪联英. 制度变迁中的权力博弈分析[J]. 中南财经政法大学学报, 2007, 0(5): 31-36,56
作者姓名:罗能生  谢里  洪联英
作者单位:湖南大学经济与贸易学院 湖南长沙410079
摘    要:制度变迁根源于人们对潜在利益的追求,也是相关利益主体之间的权力博弈过程。本文建立了一个制度变迁的双层演化博弈模型,揭示了制度变迁中利益主体之间权力博弈的动态机理。研究表明,利益主体在博弈中掌控权力的大小,决定他们在制度变迁中的地位,制度变迁会朝着有利于权力占优势的利益主体所追求的方向变革;制度也将随着博弈中各利益主体拥有权力资源的相对比例的消长变化而不断演进。

关 键 词:制度变迁  权力  博弈均衡
文章编号:1003-5230(2007)05-0031-06
修稿时间:2007-06-21

The Game Theory of Power in the Analysis of the Institutional Change
LUO Neng-sheng,XIE Li,HONG Lian-ying. The Game Theory of Power in the Analysis of the Institutional Change[J]. Journal of Zhongnan University of Finance and Economics, 2007, 0(5): 31-36,56
Authors:LUO Neng-sheng  XIE Li  HONG Lian-ying
Abstract:Institutional change is the process of people pursuing the potential benefits,also is the process of playing power game between the stakeholders.This paper builds double evolutionary game model,reveals the dynamic mechanism of power game in the transition of institution,and explains that the equilibrium of power game determines whether institution will change and how it will occur.The power of the stakeholders determines their status in the process of institutional change.The transitional direction of institution will meet the demand of the stakeholder who has greater power.With the ratio of power controlled by stakeholders varying,the institution evolves.
Keywords:Institutional Change  Power  Game Equilibrium
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