企业培训策略选择的博弈分析

企业对员工进行培训,可以提高员工的生产率,从而为企业带来更丰厚的利润,然而却又面临着员工跳槽的风险.企业为了挽留经过培训的员工,给予其较高的薪资待遇,结果给企业带来巨大的成本,甚至仍然留不住关键人才.笔者运用信号博弈的方法分析企业在员工培训方面的决策问题,得出多种均衡结果.

A Game Analysis of the Choice of Enterprises' Training Strategy

Enterprises training their employees can raise the employees' rate of production and then bring bigger profits for enterprises, but the enterprises will face the risk of the employees' job-hopping. In order to detain the trained employees enterprises give them higher salary treatment. As a result the cost of the enterprises increases greatly, yet the crucial talented persons won't stay. Using signal game theory this article analyzes the decision-making problem of enterprises in employee training and educes many equilibrium results.