On the generic nonexistence of pure strategy nash equilibria in continuous games |
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| Institution: | 1. International Monetary Fund, United States;2. Institute of Informatics, Warsaw University, Poland;3. Faculty of Economics & Christ''s College, University of Cambridge, United Kingdom;1. Dipartimento di Scienze per l''Economia e l''Impresa, Università degli Studi di Firenze, Via delle Pandette 9, 50127 Firenze, Italy;2. Dipartimento di Scienze delle Decisioni, IGIER and BIDSA, Università Commerciale Luigi Bocconi, Via Roentgen 1, 20136 Milano, Italy;1. Institute for Mathematics, Technische Universität Berlin, Sekr. MA 5-2, Straße des 17. Juni 136, 10623 Berlin, Germany;2. School of Computing Science, Sir Alwyn Williams Building, University of Glasgow, Glasgow G12 8QQ, UK;1. Department of Economics, HKUST, Clear Water Bay, Kowloon, Hong Kong;2. Department of Economics, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, Surrey, TW20 0EX, United Kingdom;1. Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Seoul, Republic of Korea;2. The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong;3. Royal Holloway, University of London, England, United Kingdom;4. Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, Japan |
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| Abstract: | S. Srivastava (J. Econ. Theory 36 (1985), 26–35) states that in the space of continuous games an open and dense subset does not have a pure strategy. Nash equilibrium. The purpose of this note is twofold: first, to show that without a connectedness assumption on the strategy sets of the players this statement is false; second, to provide correct proofs of his main results. |
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