首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

"城中村"改造中制度安排的选择
引用本文:杨爽,周晓唯."城中村"改造中制度安排的选择[J].重庆商学院学报,2006,16(4):14-18.
作者姓名:杨爽  周晓唯
作者单位:陕西师范大学国际商学院,陕西西安710062
基金项目:陕西省社会科学界联合会资助项目,陕西省西安市科技局资助项目
摘    要:"城中村"改造涉及政府、村民和开发商三者的利益冲突与协调.运用动态博弈理论分析这三个利益主体之间的关系,求得的均衡结果表明,"城中村"改造共有三种改造模式可供选择,即政府主导型、村民自治型和政府、村民、开发商共同改造型,这些模式的成功实施要遵循相应的前提条件,政府部门可以根据自己的实际情况采取最佳改造模式.

关 键 词:"城中村"  改造模式  动态博弈  制度安排  选择
文章编号:1008-6439(2006)04-0014-05
收稿时间:03 22 2006 12:00AM
修稿时间:2006年3月22日

Choice of system arrangement in the reform of "villages in cities"
YANG Shuang,ZHOU Xiao-wei.Choice of system arrangement in the reform of "villages in cities"[J].Journal of Chongqing Institute of Commerce,2006,16(4):14-18.
Authors:YANG Shuang  ZHOU Xiao-wei
Institution:International Business School, Shanxl Normal University, Shanxi Xian 710062, China
Abstract:The process of the reform of "villages in cities" includes the conflicts and coordination of the interests of governments,villagers and development businessmen.Dynamic game theory is used to analyze the relationship between the three interested parties and the equilibrium results show that there are three modes which can be chosen in the reform of "villages in cities" such as governmental leading type,villagers' autonomous type and mutual reform type of government,villagers and development businessmen.The successful implementation of these modes should follow the related premise and government departments should use optimal reform mode on the basis of real situation.
Keywords:"village in cities"  reform mode  dynamic game  system arrangement  choice
本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
点击此处可从《重庆商学院学报》浏览原始摘要信息
点击此处可从《重庆商学院学报》下载免费的PDF全文
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号