竞争企业的技术许可与市场进入策略研究

本文对在位企业和潜在进入企业同时选择技术许可费并决定是否进入市场的策略进行了分析和讨论。我们证明如果在位平台企业收取的许可费小于某一临界水平，则潜在进入企业的的最优反应是不进入；如果收取的许可费大于某临界水平，则进入企业的最优反应是进入。另外，如果在位平台企业的初始网络规模和网络外部性足够强，则在位企业选择垄断的技术许可价格，并且进入企业选择不进入。如果初始网络优势不是很大，则潜在进入者的出现使得在位企业会降低技术许可费，以形成进入壁垒。

Technology license and entry strategies of competitive firms

In this paper, we study the technology licensing and market entry strategies of a incumbent and entrant. We find if the incumbent platform firm chooses the technology license fee less than some one critical level, then the entrant platform firm＇s superior reaction is not to enter; If the technology license fee for take is higher than the some critical level, then the superior reaction of the entrant is enter. Moreover, if the incumbent＇s original network scale and the network externality is enough strong, then the incumbent chooses monopolistic licensing fee, and the entrant don＇t enter. If the original network advantage isn＇t very strong, then the emergence of the latent entranrs making the incumbent will lower the technology license fee, and formation entry barrier.