Workers’ enterprises are not perverse: differential oligopoly games with sticky price |
| |
Authors: | Roberto Cellini Luca Lambertini |
| |
Institution: | (1) Dipartimento di Economia e Metodi Quantitativi, Università di Catania, Corso Italia 55, 95129 Catania, Italy;(2) Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Università di Bologna, Strada Maggiore 45, 40125 Bologna, Italy;(3) ENCORE, Faculty of Economics and Econometrics, University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, 1018, WB, Amsterdam, Netherlands |
| |
Abstract: | We take a differential game approach to study the dynamic behaviour of labour managed (LM) firms, in the presence of price stickiness. We find that the oligopoly market populated by LM firms reaches the same steady state equilibrium allocation as the oligopoly populated by profit-maximising (PM) firms, provided that the LM membership and the PM labour force are set before the market game starts. The conclusion holds under both the open-loop solution and the closed-loop solution. The result confirms the point made by Sertel (Eur Econ Rev 31:1619–1625, 1987) in a static framework. |
| |
Keywords: | Workers’ enterprise Price dynamics Feedbacks |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|