首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

政府投资项目超概算的博弈分析
引用本文:唐秋凤.政府投资项目超概算的博弈分析[J].广西财经学院学报,2006,19(3):86-90.
作者姓名:唐秋凤
作者单位:广西财经学院,科研处,广西,南宁,530003
摘    要:政府投资项目超概算的原因是项目前期工作有缺陷,项目管理机制存在问题以及监管不到位.从一个新的角度--博弈的角度来看,政府投资项目管理其实也是一个博弈过程,而建设单位在博弈中有着"先行者优势",从而产生超概算的利益驱动.基于博弈分析,应从几个方面对政府投资项目超概算现象进行治理,包括严肃决策程序,增加建设单位超概算的成本,明确投资监督管理责任等.

关 键 词:政府投资项目  超概算  建设单位  博弈
文章编号:1673-5609(2006)03-0086-05
收稿时间:2006-02-17
修稿时间:2006-02-17

Analysis of Budgetary Overrun in Public Project Based on Game Theory
TANG Qiu-feng.Analysis of Budgetary Overrun in Public Project Based on Game Theory[J].JOURNAL OF GUANGXI UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE AND ECONOMICS,2006,19(3):86-90.
Authors:TANG Qiu-feng
Institution:Section of Scientific Research, Guangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanning 530003, China
Abstract:Factors that cause budgetary overrun in public project are shortcomings in pre - construction work and problems in management machinism and supervision system. From a new angle of the game theory, the management of a public project is an economic game. And in this game, the construction organization occupies priority position which causes intention of profit making. Based on game theory analyses, to bring budgetary overrun under control, efforts should be made in several aspects, i.e. enforcing decision- making procedure; increasing cost of budgetary overrun; and clarifying supervision responsibility etc.
Keywords:public project  budgetary overrun  construction organization  game
本文献已被 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号