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区域产业转移中的地方政府博弈
引用本文:孙华平,黄祖辉.区域产业转移中的地方政府博弈[J].贵州财经学院学报,2008(3):6-10.
作者姓名:孙华平  黄祖辉
作者单位:浙江大学,浙江,杭州,310027
摘    要:在给定资源约束的条件下,地方政府为了追求自身利益最大化必然展开竞争博弈.通过构造两层次博弈分析框架,可得出以下结论:在重复博弈两次的情况下,产业转移双方地方政府合作的子博弈精炼纳什均衡结果是可以实现的.因此,为实现区域资源配置的帕累托最优,避免陷入"囚徒困境",地方政府应整合双方的比较优势,实现优势互补,形成统一的协调机制,实现整体动态均衡的长期经济增长.

关 键 词:产业转移  地方政府  重复博弈  纳什均衡
文章编号:1003-663612008)03-0006-05
修稿时间:2008年3月14日

Games between Local Governments in Regional Industrial Transfer
SUN Hua-ping,HUANG Zu-hui.Games between Local Governments in Regional Industrial Transfer[J].Journal of Guizhou College of Finance and Economics,2008(3):6-10.
Authors:SUN Hua-ping  HUANG Zu-hui
Institution:SUN Hua-ping,HUANG Zu-hui(Zhejiang University,Hangzhou,Zhejiang 310027,China)
Abstract:Given resource constraints,local governments are inevitably involved in competitive games in pursuit of self-interest maximization.We have constructed a two-level game analysis framework and concluded that in two-period repeated games,refined Nash equilibrium for cooperative subgames between local governments is achievable.Therefore,in order to achieve regional Pareto optimal allocation of resources and avoid the Prisoner's Dilemma,local governments should combine their comparative advantages in a complemen...
Keywords:industrial transfer  local government  repeated game  Nash equilibrium  
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