Relaxing Pareto optimality in economic environments |
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Authors: | Donald E Campbell Jerry S Kelly |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics and the Thomas Jefferson Program in Public Policy, The College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA 23187-8795, USA, US;(2) Department of Economics, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244-1090, USA, US |
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Abstract: | Summary. The individual preference domain is the family of profiles of economic preferences on the set of allocations of public or
private goods, or both. The agenda domain assumption allows for a finite lower bound on the size of a feasible set. If a social
choice correspondence satisfies nonimposition, Arrow’s choice axiom, and independence of infeasible alternatives then it is
directly or inversely dictatorial, or null.
Received: October 10, 1995; revised version: June 20, 1996 |
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Keywords: | JEL Classifications Numbers: D60 D71 |
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