| 供应链企业间的委托代理问题及道德风险的防范 |
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| 引用本文： | 马丽娟. 供应链企业间的委托代理问题及道德风险的防范[J]. 商业研究, 2003, 0(9): 103-105 |
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| 作者姓名： | 马丽娟 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海大学,国际工商与管理学院,上海,201800 |
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| 摘 要： | 供应链企业间由于信息不对称而存在委托代理问题,分析委托代理问题及道德风险的产生,建立相应的防范模型,并结合供应链实际作出风险分担和激励机制的设计方案,对于降低企业风险具有重要参考价值。
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| 关 键 词： | 供应链 委托代理 道德风险 激励机制 防范模型 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-148x(2003)09-0103-02 |
| 修稿时间： | 2002-06-03 |
Problems of Principal-agent in Supply Chain Enterprises and the Prevention of Moral Hazard |
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| Abstract: | Enterprises engaged in supply chain are faced with principal-agent problems because of information asymmetry. This paper analyzes the problems of the principal-agent and the causes of moral hazard, sets up the guarding model and makes some designs for the risk shaning and incentive mechanism regarding the practical supply chain situations. There will be important reference value to cutting down risks that enterprises may meet. |
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| Keywords: | supply chain principal-agent moral hazard incentive mechanism guarding model |
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