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从控制权利益看上市公司融资行为
引用本文:张振兴. 从控制权利益看上市公司融资行为[J]. 经济经纬, 2007, 0(3): 132-134
作者姓名:张振兴
作者单位:北京大学,经济学院,北京,100871
摘    要:上市公司(特别是国有控股上市公司)治理结构的主要特征是内部人控制.上市公司的管理层和控股股东的实际控制人共同构成内部人,内部人共同分享控制权利益带来的好处.监管政策的出发点是降低控制权利益,减少内部人(控股股东和管理层)与中小股东、债权人的利益冲突,维护市场的"三公"原则.

关 键 词:控制权利益  股权融资  债务融资  实证  政策建议
文章编号:1006-1096(2007)03-0132-03
收稿时间:2006-11-27
修稿时间:2006-11-27

Viewing the Financing Behavior of Listed Companies from the Benefits of Control - right
ZHANG Zhen-xing. Viewing the Financing Behavior of Listed Companies from the Benefits of Control - right[J]. Economic Survey, 2007, 0(3): 132-134
Authors:ZHANG Zhen-xing
Affiliation:School of Economics, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China
Abstract:The main feature of the administration structure of listed companies(especially state-controlled listed companies) is the control of inside man.The managers of listed companies and the actual controllers of controlling shareholders together constitute inside man and they share the benefits brought about by control-right.The starting point of supervision policies is to reduce control-right benefits,lessen the benefit conflicts between inside man and medium and small shareholders and creditors,and maintain the "fairness,open and justice" principles of market.
Keywords:control-right benefit  equity financing  debt financing  empirical proof  suggestions on policy
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