AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO EXPLAINING BARGAINING BEHAVIOUR IN SIMPLE SEQUENTIAL GAMES |
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Authors: | Chun-Lei Yang Joachim Weimann and Atanasios Mitropoulos |
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Institution: | Research Center for Humanity and Social Sciences, TaipeiFaculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg |
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Abstract: | Abstract. For simple sequential games, the payoff structure has certain bargaining power implication. Intuitively, certain actions may have the effect of the carrot and the stick as sanctioning means. Fair outcomes can be alternatively viewed as the consequence of their presence. Experimental data on various games are used to test the hypothesis of carrot and stick behaviour. We show that our stick and carrot heuristic neatly captures puzzling phenomena in a wide class of simple sequential games. The results support the view that punishing subjects are not worse off than myopic pay-off maximizers as long as subjects are involved in a repeated strangers scheme. |
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