Do independent fiscal institutions cause better fiscal outcomes in the European Union?

This paper explores the budgetary implications of the independent fiscal institutions (IFIs) in the European Union (EU). We employ a dynamic panel model for the period 2000–2019 and find that these fiscal watchdogs have a positive and significant influence not only on government budget balance for the EU member states, resulting in smaller government budget deficits, but also on countries’ compliance with fiscal rules, results that hold across alternative fiscal balances. IFIs appear to have a beneficial impact on fiscal performance and compliance with numerical targets in countries with poorly designed fiscal responsibility norms but weaker influence when fiscal rules are less binding (well-designed fiscal rules). The findings remain significant regardless the year of accession to the EU (old vs. new members) or euro-area status (euro-area vs. non-euro-area members). However, we document that IFIs play a larger role in countries that established these monitoring bodies before 2013, indicating that experience matters in IFI performance. Also, our findings show that the influence of IFIs remains if we take into account institutional reforms in which their mandates were extended with different powers and tasks, which has a positive and significant effect on fiscal balances. Moreover, we find that, under the circumstance of systemic and banking crises, these institutions are associated with improved fiscal outcomes, reflecting their increased concern about the path of public finances and their role in reducing budgetary forecasting biases. Our results are robust to a variety of specifications and models, including alternative measures of the government budget balance and after controlling for a set of institutional characteristics and for potential endogeneity in the estimations.