The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games |
| |
| Authors: | Michael R. Baye Heidrun C. Hoppe |
| |
| Affiliation: | a Department of Business Economics, Kelley School of Business, Indiana University, 1309 East Tenth Street, Bloomington, IN 47405-1701, USA;b Department of Economics, University of Bonn, Chair Economic Theory II, Lennéstr. 37, D-53113, Bonn, Germany |
| |
| Abstract: | We establish the strategic equivalence of a variety of rent-seeking contests, innovation tournaments, and patent-race games. The results allow us to disentangle negative and positive externalities, and to apply theorems and results intended for rent-seeking games to other games, and vice versa. We conclude with several examples that highlight the practical utility of our results. |
| |
| Keywords: | Contest Rent seeking Innovation tournament R& D Patents |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
