投资银行业经理人估值与分配机制研究——基于多层次的利益相关者分析框架

现阶段我国投资银行经理人的估值与薪酬考核面临如下困境:一方面由于某种错觉,社会普遍认为投行经理人的收入远远高于合理水平;但另一方面,经理人的实际薪酬水平与其他行业以及国外同行相比明显偏低,投行经理人的激励严重不足。立足于我国现有制度现实,应该寻找一种渐进的、与现有制度安排协调的投行经理人估值与分配模式。本文基于利益相关者分析框架考察了投行经理人的估值与分配机制,运用模型从环境分析、组织模式和方法体系三个递进的层次对经理人的业绩评价进行了系统分析,从理论上对我国投资银行经理人的估值模型进行了开拓性研究。

The Research on Valuation and Compensation Mechanism of Investment Bank Executives:Based on the Framework of Multilevel Stakeholder Analysis

China’s investment bank executives face the valuation and compensation assessment dilemma: on one hand,due to some illusion it is general believed that the investment bank manager’s income is much higher than a reasonable level;on the other hand,the manager’s actual pay level is lower than other industry and their foreign counterparts significantly,the investment bank managers are shortage of incentives.Based on the reality of the existing system,coordinated with the existing institutional arrangements,we should look for a gradual valuation and distribution patterns of investment bank executives.Based on the framework for stakeholder analysis,we examined the valuation and distribution system of investment bank executives,using models from the environmental analysis,organizational models and methodologies,analyzed the performance evaluation of executives systematically.This valuation model of investment bank executives is a pioneering research in China.