Networks of knowledge among unionized firms |
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Authors: | Ana Mauleon Jose J Sempere-Monerris Vincent Vannetelbosch |
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Institution: | CEREC and FNRS, Facultés Universitaires Saint-Louis; Department of Economic Analysis and ERI-CES, University of Valencia; CORE and FNRS, Universitécatholique de Louvain |
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Abstract: | Abstract. We develop a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how trade unions will affect the stability of R&D networks through which knowledge is transmitted in an oligopolistic industry. Whenever firms settle wages, the partially connected network is likely to emerge in the long run if and only if knowledge spillovers are large enough. However, when unions settle wages, the complete network is the unique stable network. In other words, the stronger the union bargaining power is, the more symmetric stable R&D networks will be. In terms of network efficiency, the partially connected network (when firms settle wages) does not Pareto dominate the complete network (when unions settle wages) and vice versa. |
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Keywords: | C70 L13 L20 J50 D85 |
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