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公益性公共建筑节能激励契约设计
引用本文:闫辉,王要武,张磊.公益性公共建筑节能激励契约设计[J].建筑管理现代化,2011,25(4).
作者姓名:闫辉  王要武  张磊
作者单位:哈尔滨工业大学,黑龙江哈尔滨,150001
基金项目:国家“十一五”科技支撑计划重大项目(2006BAJ03A10)
摘    要:公益性公共建筑节能一般由政府和建筑业主共同出资,而业主在节能过程中存在着特殊的行为特征,尤其是因隐藏信息和隐藏行为而导致的逆向选择和道德风险行为。在深入分析公益性公共建筑节能激励机理基础上,运用激励理论,建立了政府和公益性公共建筑业主之间的委托—代理模型,并分别在完全信息和不对称信息下求解了相应的激励契约。研究得出了两种情况下激励契约的一些特征,同时,也为政府建议了一些可能的措施和机制,以达到激励公益性公共建筑节能的目的。

关 键 词:公益性公共建筑  建筑节能  激励契约  委托—代理模型  

Incentive Contract Design for Commonweal Public Building Energy Efficiency
YAN Hui,WANG Yao-wu,ZHANG Lei.Incentive Contract Design for Commonweal Public Building Energy Efficiency[J].Construction Management Modernization,2011,25(4).
Authors:YAN Hui  WANG Yao-wu  ZHANG Lei
Institution:YAN Hui,WANG Yao-wu,ZHANG Lei(Harbin Institute of Technology,Harbin 150001,China)
Abstract:Commonweal public building energy efficiency is usually jointly invested by the government and owners.The owners have special behavior characteristics in building energy efficiency,especially adverse selection and moral hazard behaviors caused by their hidden knowledge and hidden actions.Based on the analysis of incentive mechanism for commonweal public building energy efficiency and the usage of incentive theory,this paper established the principal-agent model between the government and owners,and designed...
Keywords:commonweal public building  building energy efficiency  incentive contract  principal-agent model  
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