| 企业兼容竞争的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 刘戒骄.企业兼容竞争的博弈分析[J].中国工业经济,2003(2):83-89. |
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| 作者姓名： | 刘戒骄 |
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| 作者单位： | 中国社会科学院工业经济研究所,北京市,100836 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文以双寡头博弈模型为基础，考察了产品兼容对企业价格和利润的影响，就在位企业和新进入企业如何利用兼容策略增强其竞争力进行了分析。本文的结论是，借助于历史销售优势和适当的兼容策略，优势企业可以设置策略壁垒来阻止潜在进入者的进入和胁迫市场内的竞争对手退出市场，劣势企业也可以凭借生产兼容性能相当优越或单向兼容的产品参与市场竞争。
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| 关 键 词： | 企业 双寡头博弈模型 兼容策略 企业竞争 价格 利润 竞争策略 |
| 文章编号： | 1006-480X(2003)02-0083-07 |
Game Analysis on Compatible Competition between Bilateral Oligarchs |
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| LIU Jie-jiao.Game Analysis on Compatible Competition between Bilateral Oligarchs[J].China Industrial Economy,2003(2):83-89. |
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| Authors: | LIU Jie-jiao |
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| Abstract: | This paper sheds light on the influence of compatibility on price and profit of oligarchs and looks into the differences of compatible competition strategies between dominant firms being already in market and new entrants. The paper concludes that dominant firms can obstruct the entry of potential entrants by means of history sales advantage and suitable compatibility and new entrants can take part in competition by providing high compatible products or services. |
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| Keywords: | compatibility compatible competition game analysis |
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