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Competitive environments and protective behavior
Authors:Peter Borm  Arantza Estvez-Fernndez  M Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro
Institution:aCentER and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands;bDepartment of Econometrics and Operations Research, VU University Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands;cDepartamento de Estatística e Investigación Operativa, Universidade de Vigo, 36200 Vigo, Spain
Abstract:The class of two-person competition games is introduced and analyzed. For any game in this class the set of Nash equilibria is convex and all Nash equilibria lead to the same payoff vector. Competition games are compared to other competitive environments such as unilaterally competitive games and rivalry games. Moreover, protective behavior within competitive environments is analyzed. For matrix games it is known that protective strategies profiles exactly correspond to proper equilibria. It is shown that this result can be extended to the class of unilaterally competitive games.
Keywords:Competitive environments  Unilaterally competitive games  Rivalry games  Competition games  Protective strategies
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