供应链联盟企业间信任行为博弈分析

在完全信息条件下,提出基于奖惩策略的无限次重复博弈,并对均衡结果的影响因素进行分析,但考虑现实信息的非完全性以及决策问题本身的复杂性,使得供应链联盟企业在博弈过程中很难做到完全理性,因此在基于奖惩策略的无限重复博弈的基础上,构建一个动态进化博弈模型,对信任产生的条件、影响因素及动态特征进行探讨。

Gam Analysis of the Trust Behavior of Supply Chain Alliance Enterprises

Under the condition of complete information, this paper analyzes the factors affecting the equilibrium results based on the infinitely repeated game on the strategy of rewards and punishments, but considering the reality of imperfect information and decision-making of the complexity of the problem itself, which makes the supply chain alliance enterprises in the game process is difficult to be completely rational, therefore based on infinitely repeated game on the rewards and punishment strategy, building a dynamic evolutionary game model, discusses the effect on trust producing condition, factors and dynamic characteristics.