| 企业经理人激励问题研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 窦炜,邱玉莲. 企业经理人激励问题研究[J]. 财会通讯, 2007, 0(3): 95-97 |
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| 作者姓名： | 窦炜 邱玉莲 |
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| 作者单位： | 武汉科技大学管理学院,湖北武汉430081 |
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| 基金项目： | 本文系湖北产业政策与管理研究中心资助的研究项目“国有大中型企业薪酬激励机制研究”（项目号：cy2005c12）的阶段性研究成果. |
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| 摘 要： | 随着以所有权和控制权相分离为特征的现代公司组织的形成和发展，在公司所有者不参与日常管理的前提下，如何通过公司治理机制实现对经理人的激励和约束，使股东财富最大化是现代企业管理的核心问题。本文通过委托-代理理论，对股东和经理人之间的关系进行了分析和研究，试图解释目前我国基于公司治理机制的经理人激励制度中存在的问题。
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| 关 键 词： | 委托-代理理论 不对称信息 经理人激励 |
Research on the Manager Incentive Problem |
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| Dou Wei,Qiu Yulian. Research on the Manager Incentive Problem[J]. Communication of Finance and Accounting, 2007, 0(3): 95-97 |
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| Authors: | Dou Wei Qiu Yulian |
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| Affiliation: | Management School, Wuhan UniversityofScience and Technology, Wuhan,Hubei 430081 |
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| Abstract: | With the creation and development of modern corporate organization,which is featured with the separation of ownership and management, and with premise that owners of corporation do not take part in daily running management, how to realize the restraint and incentive on managers by means of corporation governing systems, and to realize the maximum of stock-owners ' wealth ,has always been the key issue of modern enterprise management concerned. Using the consignation and authorization theory, this article systematically studies the relationship between stockowners and managers, and attempts to explain the present problems of our nation in the managers' motivation system based on the corporate management system. |
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| Keywords: | Principal-agenttheory Asymmetric information Management incentive |
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