Implementation of multi-agent incentive contracts with the principal's renegotiation offer |
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| Authors: | Hiroshi Osano |
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| Affiliation: | (1) Kyoto Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, Sakyo, Kyoto 606-8501, Japan (e-mail: osano@kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp) , JP |
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| Abstract: | The purpose of this paper is to explore a mechanism for supporting desired equilibrium actions in a one-principal, multi-agent model when the principal makes a renegotiation offer. We show that there exists a mechanism in which the principal's most preferred mixed strategy is always supported. Received: 30 May 1997 / Accepted: 10 October 1998 |
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| Keywords: | JEL classification:D82 |
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