The Siting of Hazardous Waste Facilities in Federal Systems: The Political Economy of NIMBY |
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Authors: | Per G. Fredriksson |
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Affiliation: | (1) Environment Department, World Bank, 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., 20433, U.S.A.;(2) School of Economics, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, South Australia, 5005 |
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Abstract: | This paper offers a new political economy explanation for thepervasive problem of siting hazardous waste treatment facilitiesin federal system. We first show that a decentralized systemyields the first-best waste treatment capacity level and that acentralized structure gives rise to free-riding behavior amonglocal jurisdictions. In our model, each community seeks toinfluence the central government through political contributions.This leads to suboptimal levels of treatment capacity. Thecapacity is increasing in the compensation level if the marginalbenefit of treatment capacity is sufficiently large, and in thegovernment's weight on aggregate social welfare relative tolobbying activities. The centralized system can replicate thedecentralized system with a sufficiently high compensation level.Since compensation has proved difficult, a centralized systemfaces greater obstacles than a decentralized system. |
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Keywords: | federalism free-riding institutional design lobbying noxious facilities pollution tax |
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