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The Limited Power of Voting to Limit Power
Authors:HONG GENG  ARNE ROBERT WEISS  IRENAEUS WOLFF
Affiliation:1. Laboratory for Experimental Economics, University of Bonn;2. Center for Empirical Research in Economics and Behavioral Sciences, University of Erfurt;3. University of Konstanz, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut (TWI)
Abstract:In this paper, we experimentally approach the question of which aspects of a voting procedure are able to restrict elected candidates’ willingness to use their power in an opportunistic way. For this purpose, we rule out re‐election concerns and analyze whether the presence of a vote by itself matters for the exercise of power. We compare two kinds of electoral campaigns: self‐descriptions of personality and promises regarding prospective in‐office behavior. We find that social approval as conveyed by a vote does not suffice to induce pro‐social choices by elected candidates. On the other hand, when campaigns are promise‐based, elected candidates transfer more to their recipients than candidates selected by a random draw even though promises do not differ. This refutes explanations based on a taste for consistency or costs of lying. In contrast, the fact that the correlation between dictators’ promises and their beliefs on voter expectations is considerably strengthened in the presence of a vote offers support to a guilt‐aversion hypothesis. However, this support is qualified by the correlation between dictators’ second‐order beliefs and their choices, which is weaker than predicted. Overall, our results suggest the power of voting to limit the self‐oriented exertion of power is limited and context specific.
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