Catching-Up Investment without Regulatory Commitment |
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Authors: | Dalen Dag Morten |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, Norwegian School of Management, Box 580, N-1301 Sandvika, Norway |
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Abstract: | This paper analyses a regulated firms incentives to undertake catching-up investments when the firm has private information about the initial technology and the regulator is unable to commit himself to incentive contracts prior to the firms investment decision. In the absence of commitment power, the firm takes into account that the investment decision may serve as a signal to the regulator about the firms initial technology. Any pure strategy equilibrium of the signaling game is shown to be pooling in the sense that the efficient type mimics the inefficient type by investing. By not following this strategy, the efficient type reveals its efficiency to the regulator, who responds by inducing the firm to produce without rents. Restricting attention to undefeated pooling equilibria, the level of investment is shown to be lower than the first-best level. |
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