Efficient Private Production of Public Goods under Common Agency |
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| Authors: | Didier Laussel Michel Le Breton |
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| Affiliation: | aGreqam, Université d'Aix-Marseille 2, Chateau Lafarge, Les Milles, France;bGreqam, Université d'Aix-Marseille 2;cInstitut Universitaire de France, Chateau Lafarge, Les Milles, France |
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| Abstract: | A private, profit-maximizing firm produces a public good that enters the utility functions of several users. Each of them separately designs and proposes to the firm a contract specifying a transfer payment as a function of the amount of public good supplied. The firm has to accept or to refuse each contract before knowing the realized value of a random variable that enters its cost function. We study the Nash equilibria of this game and explore some refinements ruling out Pareto inefficient equilibria.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, H41. |
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