| 风险投资中的双向道德风险与帕累托有效的合约区间-讨价还价的视角 |
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| 引用本文： | 邓艳红,陈宏民. 风险投资中的双向道德风险与帕累托有效的合约区间-讨价还价的视角[J]. 经济学(季刊), 2006, 0(3): 923-938 |
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| 作者姓名： | 邓艳红 陈宏民 |
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| 摘 要： | 该文在双向道德风险的模型下,从讨价还价的角度,研究了风险投资家和创业者之间的帕累托有效合约区间的确定问题.该文首先在给定条件下分析了帕累托有效合约区间的构造条件,并在此基础之上探讨了双方的努力效率和风险投资家的声誉动机对合约的帕累托有效区间的影响,以及投资额对帕累托有效合约的可行区间的影响,进而从理论角度解释了现实风险投资合约中存在的部分现象.
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| 关 键 词： | 风险投资 双向道德风险 合约的帕累托有效区间 |
DOUBLE MORAL HAZARD AND PARETO-EFFICIENT CONTRACTS FOR VENTURE CAPITAL:A BARGAINING-BASED STUDY |
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| Deng Yanhong and Chen Hongming. DOUBLE MORAL HAZARD AND PARETO-EFFICIENT CONTRACTS FOR VENTURE CAPITAL:A BARGAINING-BASED STUDY[J]. China Economic Quarterly, 2006, 0(3): 923-938 |
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| Authors: | Deng Yanhong and Chen Hongming |
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| Abstract: | within the frameworf of a double moral hazard model,we study the problem of pareto-efficient contracts for venture capital from the point of view of bargaining between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur.we first develop a method to find the pareto-efficiency contracting terms,and then analyze how the efforts of both sides and the venture capitalist's reputation affect the pareto-efficiency contracts.we also study the effect of investment on feasible contracts.our analysis explains some phenomena of |
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