Multimarket contact and inter-firm cooperation in R&D |
| |
Authors: | Nicholas S. Vonortas |
| |
Affiliation: | (1) Center for International Science and Technology Policy and Department of Economics, The George Washington University, 2013 G Street, N.W., Suite 201, Washington, DC 20052, USA (e-mail: vonortas@gwu.edu), US |
| |
Abstract: | Research joint ventures (RJVs) have been widely acclaimed for their alleged ability to restore private incentives to undertake R&D. Economists have, however, also sounded the alarm concerning the opportunities RJVs may create for collusion between partners. The danger of anti-competitive behavior increases significantly when repeated R&D collaboration occurs between firms that also “meet” in many product markets. This phenomenon is shown to be present in a large set of U.S.-based RJVs. The question is about the incentive trade-off: Are the alleged advantages of RJVs in terms of enhancing incentives for R&D sufficient to overcome the potential disadvantages in terms of decreasing incentives for R&D due to simultaneous multiproject and multimarket contact? Significant foreign participation, high technological and market uncertainties, and the set up of “porous” RJVs may operate as a check to anti-competitive behavior. |
| |
Keywords: | : Research joint ventures – Cooperation in research and development – Multimarket contact – Multiproject contact |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|