股权激励下双重声誉的国企经营者博弈合同分析

由于所有权与经营权的分离,国有企业委托人和代理人之间存在利益冲突。如何设计一个合理的激励合同来消除两者之间的利益冲突,是委托代理理论遇到的一个重要理论问题。本文结合国有企业经营者双重身份的特点,在经营者市场声誉和政治声誉的双重声誉下,以股权激励报酬为例对委托人与代理人之间的最优合同进行研究,认为最优激励程度与经理人风险规避系数、企业业绩波动性及各种努力的成本系数成反比,与努力之间的相关性成正比;随着短期努力对当期业绩的贡献系数和长期业绩对当期业绩的负效应系数的增大,最优激励水平不断弱化。

The Game Contract Analysis of the State-owned Enterpriser Managers Based on Double Reputation and Stock Options Incentive

As a result of the separation between the property rights and the right of management,the interests of the principal and agent exist conflict.How to design a reasonable incentive contracts to eliminate the conflict of interests between the principal-agent theory is an important theoretical problem.Combining with the state-owned enterprise operators′ characteristics of dual identity,under the dual reputation of market reputation and political reputation,taking stock options compensation as example,the paper studies the optimal contract between the principal and the agent.It shows the optimal incentive degree is negatively correlated with the factors of manager risk aversion coefficient,enterprise performance and all kinds of the effort cost coefficient.And optimal incentive degree is positively correlated with the correlation coefficient between efforts.And with the effect coefficient which reflects the relationship between the operators′ short-term behavior and the enterprise′s current performance and the effect coefficient which reflects the relationship between the operators′ long-term behavior and the enterprise′s current performance increase,the optimal incentive levels should become more weak.