Unionized labor market and licensing by a monopolist |
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Authors: | A Mukherjee U Broll S Mukherjee |
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Institution: | (1) School of Economics, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham, NG7 2RD, UK;(2) Dresden University of Technology, Dresden, Germany;(3) University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK |
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Abstract: | We show that a monopolistic final goods producer may find it profitable to create competition by licensing its technology
if the input market is imperfectly competitive. With a centralized union, we show that licensing by a monopolist is profitable
under both uniform and discriminatory wage settings by the union. However, the incentive for licensing is higher under the
former situation. We also show that licensing by the monopolist is profitable under both quantity and price competition, and
the incentive for licensing is higher under price competition than under quantity competition. Our qualitative results hold
even with decentralized unions.
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Keywords: | licensing labor union price competition quantity competition |
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