A characterization of social choice correspondences that implement the core of simple games |
| |
Authors: | Bertrand Tchantcho Lawrence Diffo Lambo |
| |
Institution: | (1) Department of Mathematics, Advanced Teachers’ Training College, University of Yaounde 1, P.O. Box 47, Yaounde, Cameroon |
| |
Abstract: | In a coalitional voting game, an alternative is said to be in the core when no majority is willing to replace it with another
alternative. A social choice correspondence is a mapping which associates any profile of voters’ preferences with a non-empty
subset of the set of alternatives, which is understood as the set of selected outcomes. We characterize the social choice
correspondences which always select the core of a simple game for any profile of preferences.
This work was completed when B. Tchantcho was Visiting assistant Professor at UTA (University of Texas at Arlington). We acknowledge
the support of the Department of Mathematics of UTA. We are most grateful to R. Pongou of Brown University, USA for his help
and advice. We sincerely thank N.G Andjiga for his helpful comments and we are indebted to two anonymous referees for their
helpful comments. |
| |
Keywords: | Simple game Social choice correspondence Implementation Core Simple game |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |