信息传递成本和预测能力不足对信贷契约的影响 |
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引用本文: | 袁克利,于金亭. 信息传递成本和预测能力不足对信贷契约的影响[J]. 济南金融, 2012, 0(11): 63-66 |
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作者姓名: | 袁克利 于金亭 |
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作者单位: | [1]东北财经大学,辽宁大连116025 [2]中国内部控制研究中心,辽宁大连116025 [3]中国大连国际合作(集团)股份有限公司,辽宁大连116021 |
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摘 要: | 信息传递成本和预测能力不足是影响信贷融资交易成本的主要因素。二者直接影响信贷融资具体方式的选择和融资过程的治理。治理这些问题的机制通常在利好情况下能够约束借款人恪守诚信,但是在利空情况下会导致低效率。能够缓解信息不对称和契约不完全问题的其他方式包括签订自我履行的信贷契约、构建关系性融资、提高契约法规的执法力度、营造诚信的商业环境和规范企业财务信息披露。
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关 键 词: | 信贷契约 信息不对称 不确定性 财务约束 |
Impact of Information Asymmetry and Unforeseen Contingencies on Debt Contract |
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Abstract: | Information asymmetry and unforeseen contingencies are the main factors of the transaction cost of debt financ- ing. They have direct impact on the choice of specific financing instrument and the governance of the financing process. Prob- lems caused by information transmission cost include resource mismatch, financial restrictions and costly-state-verification. Unforeseen contingencies lead to incomplete debt contract, then the debtor commonly initiate renegotiation and squeeze rene- gotiation rent. Mechanisms designed to solve these problems can restrain the debtor from opportunism behavior in good contin- gencies, but can lead to inefficiency in bad contingencies. Besides contracting mechanisms, self-enforcement, relationship financing, legal protect of the creditor, credibility and integrity and high quality financial reporting can also mitigate value de- stroying mitigating. |
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Keywords: | debt contract information asymmetry unforeseen contingencies financial restrictions |
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