Folk theorem with communication |
| |
Authors: | Ichiro Obara |
| |
Institution: | a Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, 1035 Heller Hall, 271, 19th Avenue South, Minneapolis, MN 55455, USA b University of California, Los Angeles, USA |
| |
Abstract: | This paper proves a new folk theorem for repeated games with private monitoring and communication, extending the idea of delayed communication in Compte O. Compte, Communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring, Econometrica 66 (1998) 597-626] to the case where private signals are correlated.The sufficient condition for the folk theorem is generically satisfied with more than two players, even when other well-known conditions are not. The folk theorem also applies to some two-players repeated games. |
| |
Keywords: | C72 C73 D82 |
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录! |
|