Bayesian coalitional rationalizability |
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Authors: | Xiao Luo Chih-Chun Yang |
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Institution: | a Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei 115, Taiwan, ROC b Department of Economics, National University of Singapore, Singapore 117570, Singapore c Department of Economics, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627, USA |
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Abstract: | In this paper we extend Ambrus's A. Ambrus, Coalitional rationalizability, Quart. J. Econ. 121 (2006) 903-929] concept of “coalitional rationalizability (c-rationalizability)” to situations where, in seeking mutually beneficial interests, players in groups (i) make use of Bayes' rule in expectation calculations and (ii) contemplate various deviations, i.e., the validity of deviation is checked against any arbitrary sets of strategies, and not just only against restricted subsets of strategies. We offer an alternative notion of Bayesian c-rationalizability suitable for such complex social interactions. We show that Bayesian c-rationalizability possesses nice properties similar to those of conventional rationalizability. |
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Keywords: | C70 C72 D81 |
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