A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games |
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Authors: | Yuichi Yamamoto |
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Affiliation: | Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, United States |
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Abstract: | The present paper studies repeated games with private monitoring, and characterizes the set of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in the limit as the discount factor approaches one and the noise on private information vanishes. Contrary to the conjecture by Ely et al. [J.C. Ely, J. Hörner, W. Olszewski, Belief-free equilibria in repeated games, Econometrica 73 (2005) 377-415], the equilibrium payoff set is computed by the same formula, no matter how many players there are. As an application of this result, a version of the folk theorem is established for N-player prisoner's dilemma games. |
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Keywords: | C72 C73 D82 |
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