Trading with a common agent under complete information: A characterization of Nash equilibria |
| |
Authors: | Gabriella Chiesa |
| |
Affiliation: | Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Piazza Scaravilli 2, I-40126 Bologna, Italy |
| |
Abstract: | We analyze an abstract model of trading where N principals submit quantity-payment schedules that describe the contracts they offer to an agent, and the agent then chooses how much to trade with every principal. This represents a special class of common agency games with complete information. We study all the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of these games, not only truthful ones, providing a complete characterization of equilibrium payoffs. In particular, we show that the equilibrium that is Pareto-dominant for the principals is not truthful when there are more than two of them. We also provide a partial characterization of equilibrium strategies. |
| |
Keywords: | C72 D43 D44 |
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录! |
|