| 排污权拍卖的最优机制设计 |
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| 引用本文： | 邝山. 排污权拍卖的最优机制设计[J]. 上海管理科学, 2006, 28(3): 76-77 |
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| 作者姓名： | 邝山 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海交通大学经济与管理学院 |
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| 基金项目： | 教育部人文社会科学规划项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 采用拍卖的方式分配排污权既是环境污染外部性的内部化,又是市场价格扭曲的纠正。本文基于一级密封价格拍卖方式,分析了排污权拍卖中厂商的最优策略和政府对排污权拍卖的机制设计问题。
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| 关 键 词： | 排污权交易 拍卖机制 |
The Mechanic Design in Pollution Permits Auction |
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| Kuang shan. The Mechanic Design in Pollution Permits Auction[J]. Shanghai Managent Science, 2006, 28(3): 76-77 |
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| Authors: | Kuang shan |
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| Abstract: | Using auction to distribute pollution permits can not only internalizes the exterior problem of environmental pollution, but also adjust the contorted market price. Based on the first-price sealed auction, this paper has discussed the firms' optimal strategy in pollution permits auction and the government's design problem in auction system. |
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| Keywords: | pollution permits trading auction system |
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