|
|||||
|
|
The dynamics of the free-rider problem in takeovers |
|
| Authors: | Harrington, JE, Jr Prokop, J |
| Affiliation: | 1 The Johns Hopkins University, USA 2 Deapartment of Management and Strategy, Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208, USA z Corresponding author |
| Abstract: | We explore the dynamics of a takeover bid. In contrast to precedingmodels, if the initial takeover bid is unsuccessful a raideris allowed to make a new tender offer in order to try and securethe remaining shares. Numerical analysis shows that the raider'stender offer rises over time as be accumulates more shares.The anticipation of a higher tender offer in the future makesshareholders more inclined to hold their shares and forces theraider to offer a higher premium than is predicted by statictheories. As the time between tender offers goes to zero, weshow analytically that the expected profit from engaging ina takeover goes to zero. |
| Keywords: | |
| 本文献已被 Oxford 等数据库收录！ | |