| 低碳经济下政企的动态博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 曹爱红,韩伯棠,齐安甜. 低碳经济下政企的动态博弈分析[J]. 生态经济(学术版), 2011, 0(3) |
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| 作者姓名： | 曹爱红 韩伯棠 齐安甜 |
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| 作者单位： | 曹爱红,韩伯棠,CAO Aihong,HAN Botang(北京理工大学,管理与经济学院,北京,100081);齐安甜,QI Antian(国家开发银行,金融研究院,北京,100083) |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金项目，中国博士后科学基金 |
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| 摘 要： | 根据低碳发展对经济的要求建立了一个关于政府部门激励与不激励、企业实施(节能减排措施)与不实施、政府部门惩罚与不惩罚的两方三阶段动态博弈模型,并求出模型的均衡解.然后根据对均衡解的分析得出企业实现低碳发展模式的必要条件,由此提出政府对企业的节能减排进行激励的重要性.最后提出了我国实现低碳发展模式的政策建议.
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| 关 键 词： | 低碳 政府与企业 动态博弈 |
The Dynamic Analysis between Government and Enterprise in Low-Carbon Economy |
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| CAO Aihong,HAN Botang,QI Antian. The Dynamic Analysis between Government and Enterprise in Low-Carbon Economy[J]. Ecological Economy, 2011, 0(3) |
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| Authors: | CAO Aihong HAN Botang QI Antian |
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| Affiliation: | CAO Aihong1,HAN Botang1,QI Antian2(1.School of Management and Economics,Beijing Institute of Technology,Beijing 100081,China,2.Financial research & development center,China Development Bank,Beijing 100083,China) |
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| Abstract: | According to the economic development of the low carbon requirements a two-person dynamic game model between government and enterprise based is build up in this paper.The action profile includes three stages: government's motivation or not,enterprise's taking saving measures or not and government's punishment or not,the model of equilibrium is solved.Meanwhile reputation mechanism is introduced in the model and its equilibrium solution is got too.Then through analyzing the equilibrium's solution the paper p... |
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| Keywords: | low carbon government and enterprise dynamic game |
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