| 节能减排的进化博弈分析 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 余孝军. 节能减排的进化博弈分析[J]. 生态经济(学术版), 2011, 0(4) |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 余孝军 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 贵州财经学院,数学与统计学院,贵州,贵阳,550004;贵州省经济系统仿真重点实验室,贵州,贵阳,550004 |
| |
| 基金项目： | 贵州省自然科学基金项目 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 节能减排过程中主体的策略选择行为非常重要,通过运用进化博弈理论建立企业群体之间、企业群体与监察部门之间的博弈模型以及它们对应的复制动态方程,并对动态方程进行分析与讨论,得到了博弈模型中各博弈方的进化稳定策略,在此基础上,提出了合理性建议.
|
| 关 键 词： | 节能减排 进化博弈理论 复制动态方程 进化稳定策略 |
Evolutionary Game Analysis on Energy-Saving and Emission Reduction |
| |
| YU Xiaojun. Evolutionary Game Analysis on Energy-Saving and Emission Reduction[J]. Ecological Economy, 2011, 0(4) |
| |
| Authors: | YU Xiaojun |
| |
| Affiliation: | YU Xiaojun(School of Mathematics and Statistics,Guizhou College of Finance and Economics,Guiyang Guizhou 550004,China,Guizhou Key Laboratory of Economic System Simulation,China) |
| |
| Abstract: | The strategy choice of players in energy-saving and emission reduction process are very importation.This paper presents a game model among enterprises and a game between enterprise and the department of supervision by using the evolutionary game theory.The duplicative dynamic equations of these games are formulated and solved for stable solutions.Various evolutionary stable strategies are analyzed and some reasonable advices based on the evolutionary game model are proposed. |
| |
| Keywords: | energy-saving and emission reduction evolutionary game theory duplicative dynamic equation evolutionary stable strategy |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
|
