| 管理层权力、大股东掏空对真实盈余管理的影响研究 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 喻凯,梁丽. 管理层权力、大股东掏空对真实盈余管理的影响研究[J]. 财务与金融, 2016, 0(3): 45-50. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1674-3059.2016.03.010 |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 喻凯 梁丽 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 中南大学商学院 湖南长沙,410083 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 基于A股上市公司2009-2014年的数据，论文研究了管理层权力、大股东掏空对真实盈余管理的影响。研究结果表明：管理层权力与真实盈余管理正相关；大股东掏空引发其与管理层的合谋，对管理层权力与真实盈余管理的正相关关系起到正向调节作用；同时，管理层权力与真实盈余管理的正相关关系及大股东掏空的正向调节作用在国有企业比非国有企业显著。
|
| 关 键 词： | 真实盈余管理 管理层权力 大股东掏空 产权性质 |
Research of the Impact of Managerial Power and Tunneling on Real Earnings Management |
| |
| YU Kai,LIANG Li. Research of the Impact of Managerial Power and Tunneling on Real Earnings Management[J]. Accounting and Finance, 2016, 0(3): 45-50. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1674-3059.2016.03.010 |
| |
| Authors: | YU Kai LIANG Li |
| |
| Abstract: | Based on the data of A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2014, this paper tests the impact of managerial power and tunneling on real earnings management. The results show that: (1) Managerial power and real earnings management are positively correlated. (2) Tunneling strengthens the positive correlation between managerial power and real earnings manage-ment. (3) Considering the effect of property rights, two effects at state-owned enterprises mentioned above are more obvious than that of non-state-owned enterprises. |
| |
| Keywords: | Real Earnings Management Managerial Power Tunneling Property Rights |
| 本文献已被 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
