Competition policy, collusion, and tacit collusion |
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Authors: | Stephen Martin |
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Affiliation: | aDepartment of Economics, Krannert School of Management, Purdue University, 403 West State Street, West Lafayette, IN 47907-2056, USA |
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Abstract: | In this paper, I pursue three goals. The first is to model collusion in a way that is distinct from noncooperative collusion. The second and third are to develop a particular specification of a standard model of noncooperative collusion that permits explicit solution for equilibrium outputs and reversion thresholds and to extend this analysis to allow for a deterrence-based competition policy that investigates conduct based on observed high prices (investigation thresholds). |
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Keywords: | Competition policy Antitrust policy Collusion Tacit collusion |
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