| 退出与筛选机制中集群间机会主义行为演化路径分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 赵骅,范珂宏.退出与筛选机制中集群间机会主义行为演化路径分析[J].改革与战略,2014(7):48-52. |
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| 作者姓名： | 赵骅 范珂宏 |
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| 作者单位： | 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030 |
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| 基金项目： | 重庆市重点软科学基金项目：重庆市信息工业企业簇创新集君和匕发展的模式设计（项目编号：CSCT2010CE0035）;中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目：高新技术产业集群知识创新能力研究（项目编号：CDJXSll020028）. |
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| 摘 要： | 文章利用演化博弈理论,建立两个企业集群间企业合作竞争机制演化博弈的模型,分析伴随退出与寻找机制的企业合作竞争机制的演变。研究表明:继续合作的可能性与寻求合作所花费的时间对于机会主义行为演化发挥着重要的作用。当继续合作的可能性足够大时,寻求合作所花费的时间决定了系统是否向互惠者演化;当继续合作的可能性过低时,寻求合作所花费的时间将决定系统向"囚徒困境"或"鹰鸽"进行演化。
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| 关 键 词： | 企业集群 机会主义者行为 演化博弈 退出机制 |
The Evolutionary Path of Cluster Opportunistic Behavior in the Exit and Selection Mechanism |
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| Zhao Hua,Fan Kehong.The Evolutionary Path of Cluster Opportunistic Behavior in the Exit and Selection Mechanism[J].Reformation & Strategy,2014(7):48-52. |
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| Authors: | Zhao Hua Fan Kehong |
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| Institution: | (School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400030) |
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| Abstract: | Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper established the model of the mechanism of cooperation and competition among companies in enterprise cluster and analyzes the dynamic processes in the mechanism of cooperation and competition with exit option and search mechanism. The results showed that： the possibility to continue cooperation and the time spent looking for cooperation plays a important role in evolution of the opporturfism behavior. When the possibility of continued cooperation is large enough for cooperation between the length of time it takes to determine the system of mutual benefit is the possibility of evolution .When the probability is too low, the time of seeking cooperation will determine the system to the ＂prisoner＇s dilemma＂ or ＂Hawk and Dove＂ evolution. |
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| Keywords: | enterprise cluster opportunistic behavior evolutionary game exit option |
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