首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     


Labor market cycles, unemployment insurance eligibility, and moral hazard
Authors:Min Zhang
Affiliation:a Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Department of Economics, 777 Guoding Road, Shanghai, 200433, China
b University of Toronto, Department of Economics, 150 St. George Street, Toronto, Canada, M5S 3G7
Abstract:If entitlement to UI benefits must be earned with employment, generous UI is an additional benefit to working, so, by itself, it promotes job creation. If individuals are risk neutral, then there is a UI contribution scheme that eliminates any effect of UI on employment decisions. As with Ricardian Equivalence, this result should be useful to pinpoint the effects of UI to violations of its premises. Our baseline simulation shows that if the neutral contribution scheme derived in this paper were to be implemented, the average unemployment rate in the United States would fall from 5.7 to 4.7 percent. Also, the results show that with endogenous UI eligibility, one can simultaneously generate realistic productivity driven cycles and realistic responses of unemployment to changes in UI benefits.
Keywords:E24   E32   J64
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号