Labor market cycles, unemployment insurance eligibility, and moral hazard |
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Authors: | Min Zhang |
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Affiliation: | a Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Department of Economics, 777 Guoding Road, Shanghai, 200433, China b University of Toronto, Department of Economics, 150 St. George Street, Toronto, Canada, M5S 3G7 |
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Abstract: | If entitlement to UI benefits must be earned with employment, generous UI is an additional benefit to working, so, by itself, it promotes job creation. If individuals are risk neutral, then there is a UI contribution scheme that eliminates any effect of UI on employment decisions. As with Ricardian Equivalence, this result should be useful to pinpoint the effects of UI to violations of its premises. Our baseline simulation shows that if the neutral contribution scheme derived in this paper were to be implemented, the average unemployment rate in the United States would fall from 5.7 to 4.7 percent. Also, the results show that with endogenous UI eligibility, one can simultaneously generate realistic productivity driven cycles and realistic responses of unemployment to changes in UI benefits. |
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Keywords: | E24 E32 J64 |
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