投资者保护与创业

我们通过私募资金市场(private capital mar- ket)搜寻模型的均衡,来研究投资者保护对外部融资可得性(availability)、企业家才能(entrepreneurship)和创业所产生的影响。除了搜寻成本(friction)之外,我们还考察了合约成本,特别是由于企业家(entrepre- neur)可能侵夺融资人(financier)所导致的事中和事后(expost)道德风险问题。在我们的模型中,政府选择投资者保护水平,以确定项目盈余(match surplus)在创业者与融资人之间的可转让性。结果表明任何鼓励(抑制)企业家才能的做法也会鼓励(抑制)创业。因此,投资者保护的创业效应取决于各种搜寻成本和合约成本的相对影响。只有当投资者保护对与事中道德风险相比的事后道德风险问题产生更大的影响时,加强投资者保护才能促进创业。我们也发现搜寻成本削弱了投资者保护的积极效应,同时,合约成本则修正了标准的荷氏(Hosios)效率条件。

Investor Protection and Business Creation

We study the effects of investor protection on the availability of external finance,entrepreneur- ship,and creation of new firms in an equilibrium search model of private capital markets.In addition to search frictions,we examine contract frictions,spe- cifically interim and ex post moral hazard problems stemming from entrepreneurs' possibilities to expro- priate financiers.In our model,the government choo- ses the level of investor protection that determines the transferability of match surplus between entrepre- neurs and financiers.The results indicate that any- thing that increases (decreases) entrepreneurship also increases (decreases) the creation of start-ups.The effect of investor protection on the creation of start- ups thus hinges on the relative importance of various search and contract frictions.Only when investor pro- tection has a sufficiently large impact on the ex post moral hazard problem relative to the interim moral hazard does strengthening investor protection enhance start-up creation.We also find that search frictions dilute the beneficial effect of investor protection and that contract frictions modify the standard Hosios condition for efficiency.